SPECIAL FORCES IN CRISIS

SF DOCTRINE AND TRAINING ERODING

Since “The Long Farewell” was written (June 2007), it is evident that the erosion of Special Forces is more serious than previously realized. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is not even “a pygmy in the lineup of TRADOC schools.” JFKSWCS is missing from the TRADOC listing of branch centers and schools altogether. It is an orphan, with neither guidance nor funding from the U. S. Army organization designed to support it. The Special Forces branch, together with the officer, warrant officer, and NCO career management for that branch, is twisting in the wind.

By removing SWCS from TRADOC and removing responsibility for combat developments from SWCS, senior Army leaders have crippled Special Forces doctrine, organization, training, material acquisition, leadership development, personnel management, facilities, and maintenance. “Center and School” is becoming a hollow title; SWCS is being degraded to the equivalent of Ranger School, and the branch to the status of a department within a branch. JFKSWCS is still producing field manuals, but they are being handled in an offline manner instead of in the system used by TRADOC for all other U. S. Army centers and schools.

THE MARINES KEEP UP THE FAITH

Funding that should be used to beef up the SF groups and restore a world-class training and education center at USAJFKSWCS is going to the MARSOC and other redundant training designed to support the JSOC special mission units. In the meantime, a significant percentage of Special Forces funding is projected to come from the uncertain GWOT supplements and “unfunded requirements” instead of programmed monies. Is the auditing agency that reports to Congress aware of this? Please note, too, that the entire United States Marine Corps is in support of the MARSOC, expressing pride and advertising every advance, while the United States Army does not promote Special Forces except as part of “special operations forces,” though Special Forces is an Army combat arms branch. USSOCOM prefers not to mention Special Forces at all except in a general list of unit types, and has been the major operator in the blurring of distinctions between SF and SOF.

The glass ceiling for Special Forces officers is still very much in effect. Recently and belatedly, two Special Forces major generals have been appointed to lieutenant general. This is a mere Band-Aid on a gaping wound. Special Forces still has no representative when the four-stars sit down to serve out the fiscal pie, or when decisions are made with long-term effects to the force. Until major generals from SF branch are routinely offered command of an Army division, there is no equity for Special Forces officer development.

Until Special Forces has a bench of seasoned three- and four-star generals on active duty, and until there are retired three- and four-star Special Forces generals as elders, there are no “keepers of the flame” for Special Forces at the national level.

IMPACT ON THE SOLDIER

If USAJFKSWCS and the SF branch have been kicked to the curb, how does this impact the individual Special Forces Soldier? Denied advocacy at the very top levels of the U. S. Army and USSOCOM to ensure that his training and assignments will optimize his skills as well as his recognition and rewards, the individual Green Beret is at a severe disadvantage.

Are the present assignments and missions of Special Forces Soldiers in keeping with the traditional SF capability? Are the skills of SF Soldiers eroding because of having to support too many direct-action missions? Why has the number of JCETs performed by Special Forces worldwide decreased? With funding cuts and no advocate at the top levels, the operational tempo for the individual Green Beret is using him up instead of conserving him as a valuable asset. Little respect is shown by senior leaders to U. S. Army Special Forces: LTG (Ret) Dell Daily, while still on active duty and while making a speech to U. S. Ambassadors at a demonstration put on by JSOC at Ft. Bragg, called Special Forces Soldiers “housekeepers,” while describing the special mission units in JSOC as the “true warriors in USSOCOM.”

What?

GLOBAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES TO THE WIND

As for the “global expeditionary forces” that were projected in 2006 and discussed in “The Long Farewell,” the term seems to have faded away. The Joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) are still with us. The JSOTF ignores the concept of the SF group HQ organized as the Special Forces operational base (SFOB). This means, among other egregious things, the elimination of the area specialist team (AST), a direct link and the ultimate in support for the operational detachments and therefore for the SF Soldier. Knowledge of how to set up and utilize the SFOB and the AST is being lost, with a generation of Green Berets used as “housekeeping” for USSOCOM.

This is a command and control issue that is crucial to the understanding of the difference between Special Forces and “special operations forces.” JSOTF is a top-down, conventional battle staff concept that works well with the conventional elite special mission units of JSOC. The SFOB, on the other hand, was developed for a responsive command and control of decentralized operations conducted by small operational detachments over a large geographical area, perhaps an entire country.

If the JSOTF is a good idea, when can we expect the Joint infantry task force? What about the Joint aviation task force, with command rotating among the services? Will the Army  or the Marines command the Joint infantry task force? Would a Joint maritime task force be commanded by the Navy or the Coast Guard? Will all the branches, divisions, and services eventually disappear into the purple haze?

THE SAME TIRED BUREAUCRACY

For three or more years, talking heads on the major news networks have been telling the world about direct action vs. indirect action. In 2007, Congress directed USSOCOM to review its roles and missions with regard to all forces assigned to USSOCOM as the first step to eliminate redundancy and wastage of funds and to give indirect actions supporting UW and COIN a higher priority than previously demonstrated. Has USSOCOM proposed beefing up U. S. Army Special Forces Command as a response to the House Armed Services Committee? Has USSOCOM given U. S. Army Special Forces Command a budget more in keeping with its contribution? Has USSOCOM recommended giving U. S. Army Special Forces Command equal status with JSOC in command structure? Or did the direct action forces start using the mantra “with-by-through” while leaving the same tiered bureaucracy in place? Is the same inadequate direct action mechanism still attempting to execute indirect action missions? Are U. S. Army Special Forces teams in Afghanistan still at the bottom of the food chain for resupply – up to two weeks, according to Soldiers fresh from the field?

THE PREMIER UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCE

Since “The Long Farewell” was written, General Petraeus has reversed the tragic embarrassment in Iraq by getting Soldiers out of their FOBs and into the villages. Is USSOCOM paying attention? Is the United States going to write an after-action report that reflects the truth about how to conduct counterinsurgency operations? Are the operational planners at DOD and the geographic commands incorporating the key principles of counterinsurgency (take, hold, rebuild) into U. S. regional plans?

Nothing to date has shown a  clear intent by the U. S. Army senior leadership or USSOCOM to recognize U. S. Army Special Forces as the nation’s premier organization capable of carrying out unconventional warfare in all its guises, as well as a force multiplier without peer. USSOCOM contin ues to support statements to the contrary, such as the MARSOC’s claim to be “the premier unconventional warfare force in the world.” USSOCOM itself has referred to the MARSOC as “a great leap forward in UW capability.” Who believes that? The MARSOC doubtless has great Marines, but they are novices at UW.

MISSING: A PRESIDENT WITH VISION

These and other issues have been identified and brought to the attention of the U. S. Army senior leaders, and the Commander, USSOCOM. These issues are “under consideration.” Will there be a reversal of the erosion of the force by U. S. Army leadership? Will USSOCOM recognize and appreciate the major contribution made by U. S. Army Special Forces? Will Congress, or perhaps another President with the vision of John F. Kennedy, intervene? Will the 50-year struggle to be recognized and supported by the Army ultimately have to be resolved by the Congress in the same manner as the struggle of the Navy’s nuclear submariners when they were scorned and resisted by conventional surface Navy brass? Or will Special Forces continue to be treated with disdain in spite of their stellar performance in Iraq and Afghanistan from the outset? Only time will tell.

DO OR DIE

Every Special Forces Soldier—officer or NCO, active or retired—and every friend of Special Forces can contact his elected representatives with concerns about the following systemic issues that continue to impact SF Soldiers and their capability:

(1) The blurring of Special Forces roles and missions in UW/FID/COIN.

(2) The establishment of an operational Special Forces command equal to JSOC in funding and all other respects.

(3) The re-establishment of USAJFKSWCS as a world-class TRADOC school and center, providing leadership and training to all unconventional forces

(4) The elimination of the “glass ceiling” that robs Special Forces Soldiers of equal representation at the highest levels of DOD decision making.

The capability, the considerable contributions, and the legacy of the individual Special Forces Soldier cannot be taken from him. But the continued degrading of the force results in a corresponding diminishment of our nation’s military operational capability as we move further into the new century.

U.S. Army Special Forces is the only U.S. force trained and organized to support the principles of take–hold–rebuild, working by, with, and through the local population.

U.S. Army Special Forces is the only military organization in the U.S. arsenal capable of conducting all aspects of unconventional warfare (in accordance with the DOD definition), counterinsurgency operations, and foreign internal defense in support of our country teams and ambassadors around the world.

De Oppresso Liber